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The impact of an ad vakmtn pesticide tax on cropping patterns and pesticide use was
examined In the South Central Texas Crop Reporting District. Output supply equations were
econometrically estimated and used in the simulation. A 25 percent tax on pesticide was estimated
to have major impacts on cropping patterns and on pesticide use. Assuming other input and output
prices were unaffected, the supply of one important crop would fall by more than half. Demand
for some of the highly soluble and persistent pesticides, which present the greatest threat to
groundwater quality, would also decrease substantially (some as much as 50 percent).
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Environmental degradation is a major
societal concern, One environmental problem that
has received much media and some scientific
attention is pesticide usage (Carson; Batie).
Pesticides were first introduced into U.S. agriculture
in 1870 when paris green was developed to battle
the potato beetle. Since that time, pesticides have
become an important agricultural input and have
contributed to major increases in the productivity of
the sector (Osteen and Szmcdra).
While pesticides have greatly enhanced
agricultural output, they have come to be regarded
as a “two-edged sword” (Taylor et al,).
Considerable attention has turned to the potential
hazards associated with pesticide use. These
hazards include toxicity to humans, chronic health
effects, food safety, fish and wildlife mortality, and
groundwater and surface water pollution (Osteen
and Szmedra). Although certainly not the only
hazards of concern, food safety and drinking water
quality are significant problems. Taylor et al. (p.
16) note that they “appear to dominate the current
debate.” Pesticide residues can pollute water and
make it unfit or harmfid for human consumption.
They can reach and pollute groundwater through
leaching, and they can pollute surface water through
rainfall runoff and aerial drift.
In a 1990 national survey of more than
1300 drinking water wells, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) found at least one
pesticide present in 10 percent of the community
water system wells and 4 percent of the rural
domestic wells (Briskin; Taylor et aL); 0.6 percent
of the rural wells and none of the community wells
had pesticide levels in excess of the EPA levels for
health concern. While it is not clear that residues in
small concentrations are harmful, this finding of
little health risk from current pesticide concentration
in drinking water wells warrants several cautions:
(a) a more restricted 26-state, 89-county survey of
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drinking water wells in rural areas found a much
larger proportion of wells contaminated with
pesticides (Klein); (b) pesticide leaching through the
soil is very slow (Griffin) which means that
groundwater contamination could increase even if
no additional pesticides are used; (c) unless an
aquifer undergoes substantial drawdown and
recharge, groundwater contamination by persistent
pesticides is generally irreversible and the only
effective option often is to abandon groundwater
sources that reach health hazard levels (Griffin).
Thus, with agricultural producers using more than
twice as much pesticide as they used 25 years ago
(Delve), much attention In the debate over water
quality is centering on agricultural practices.
The problem is that the debate, although
intense, is not supported on either side by much
hard scientific evidence. Rachel Carson’s book
focused media and public attention on agricultural
chemical use and its potential risks in the early
1960s. Scientific and public concern resulted in the
establishment of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in 1970 and the banmng of DDT in
1972. Scientific interest was heightened in the late
1970s when the herbicide aldicarb was first
discovered in groundwater in Suffolk County, New
York (Batie). Considerable monitoring of
groundwater has occurred since then, but still little
is known about chemical Ieaching rates, and the
evidence on “carcinogenic, mutagenic, and
neurological effects of pesticides [in low dosages] is
not conclusive” (Batie, p. 5). There is also virtually
no information concerning monetary measures of
chemical-caused damages (Griffin).
While regulatory alternatives to deal with
pesticide contamination of groundwater are currently
being considered by the EPA, some extreme
proposals have focused on either completely
eliminating pesticides and other agricultural
chemicals (or at least specific chemicals in certain
locations or on particular crops) or maintaining the
status quo (Taylor et al.). Several other alternatives
have also been suggested for reducing pesticide use.
One option includes a voluntary change in farming
practices through use of integrated pest management
or low input, sustainable agriculture programs. A
second option encourages reduced chemical use
through cross-compliance with government farm
programs. A third alternative is to place an ad
valorem tax on all pesticides.
The last option’s purpose would be to
effect voluntary reductions in pesticide use by
increasing its private cost to more nearly
approximate its social cost. It has three advantages
over several of the alternative proposals: (a) Since
it acknowledges a positive marginal externality cost
of pesticide use but does not infer it is infinite, it
desirably falls substantially between the extreme
positions of status quo and a complete ban on all
pesticides (Taylor et al.). (b) A management
practice incentive (such as an ad valorem tax) is
superior from an efficiency perspective to runoff
incentives (e.g., tax on pesticides in water runoff),
pesticide standards (e.g., limits on pesticides in
runoff), or management practice standards (e.g.,
restrictions on number of pesticide applications) for
reducing agricultural nonpoint pollution (Shortle and
Dunn). i (c) Since political preferences favor
management practice incentive schemes, a tax may
also be politically acceptable (Shortle and Dunn).
It is the option examined in this study.
Changes in policy affect various groups of
people in different ways. In order to anticipate the
distributional impacts of policy changes, analysis
must be conducted at a relative] y disaggregated
level. For example, a tax on all pesticides will
change crop mixes and impact various regions in
unequal ways (McIntosh and Williams; Lim et al,).
The voluntary decisions made by producers in
response to the uniformly imposed tax will
determine the nature of these outcomes as well as
the impact on water quality and consumer prices of
food and fiber.
Objective and Organization
The objective of this study is to estimate
the impact of an ad valorem pesticide tax on
cropping patterns, pesticide demand, and water
quality in the South Central Texas Crop Reporting
District (8-N) (Figure 1), This district includes 21
counties, many of which are environmentally
sensitive with respect to water quality. They spread
across four major aquifers, including the Edwards,
Trinity, Carrizo-Wilcox, and Gulf Coast. Rivers
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Colorado, Guadalupe, San Marcos, San Antonio,
Navidad, and Lavaca.
Perhaps of greatest policy importance from
a water quality standpoint is the fact that the district
encompasses two-thirds of the San Antonio and
Austin regions of the Edwards Aquifer. This
underground storage facility supplies municipal,
recreational, and industrial water to more than 1.3
million people in San Antonio, Austin, and nearby
cities. It is recharged in a unique manner. Water
enters the formation through fractured limestone,
sinkholes, and caves, so the normal filtration effect
of water passing through many feet of soil into an
aquifer does not occur to the same extent here.
Consequently, although Edwards Aquifer water
currently is of excellent quality (based on EPA
standards), there is a high potential for pesticides
present in surface water to move directly into this
aquifer (TAEX-SCS-ASCS).
Much of the agricultural production in the
district occurs in areas at high risk for groundwater
contamination. The susceptibility ofgroundwater in
the entire district to contamination is reflected by
moderate to high DRASTIC scores (Texas Water
Commission 1989a). These scores depict
groundwater pollution potential which may result
from widespread, surface-applied pesticides and
fertilizer.
An econometric approach is taken in this
study to estimate actual voluntary production
responses in the district. The approach is
imprecise largely because of the limited data
available. Nevertheless, important insights are
generated about voluntary collective responses of
economic agents in one environmentally sensitive
area. The insights are relevant for policy efforts to
internalize social costs of environmental degradation
in the area.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: The analytical procedures are developed
first, Data sources are identified next, They are
followed by presentation of major findings and then
the conclusions.
Method of Analysis
Crop supply equations for the district were
estimated using time series data, elasticities were
derived, and likely impacts of a 25 percent ad
valorem pesticide tax on cropping patterns were
simulated. Then using point estimates of major
pesticides used on each crop in the district (and
assuming fixed proportions of pesticide and land),
expected impacts on pesticide use were derived.
The assumption of fixed proportions production was
imposed because of lack of time series data on input
usage in the district. The direction of potential bias
in the simulated results caused by this assumption
was evaluated. Limited implications for
groundwater quality were then drawn.
Suppl.v Equations
The system of output-supply equations was
econometrically estimated assuming that the
producers in the district collectively behave like a
price-taking, profit-maximizing firm with a twice-
continuously-differentiable production function and
some constraining input supplies. Lim conducted
nonparametric tests of the profit-maximization
hypothesis for the state-level aggregate of producers
in Texas and found little empirical departure from
this hypothesis. Parametric tests have also
frequent] y failed to reject the implications of either
of the above hypotheses using aggregate data
(Rossi; Shumway and Alexander). Therefore, in
estimating the systems of supply equations, two
behavioral characteristics of price-taking, profit-
maximizing firms (homogeneity and convexity)
were maintained, A twice-continuously-
differentiable production function for a profit-
maximizing producer (i.e., symmetry of cross-price
supply parameters) was also assumed.
Linear supply equations were estimated that
are the first derivatives of a normalized quadratic
form of the restricted profit function, This
functional form was chosen to be consistent with
Ornelas’ finding (based on nested hypothesis tests,
predictive accuracy, and statistical performance) that
the normalized quadratic profit function was
generally preferred over the translog and generalized
Leontief for modeling Texas agriculture.J Agr, and Applied Econ, July, 1994
Figure 1. South Central Texas Crop Reporting District (8-N)
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For consistency with short-run profit
maximization, the independent variables were
expected output prices for four individual crops
(with highest value of production in the district) and
an aggregate of other crops produced in the district,
variable input prices for pesticides and an
aggregate of other variable inputs, an aggregate
fixed-input quantity, a farm policy variable
(effective diversion payments), and time, Input-
demand equations were not estimated due to lack of
district-level data on most inputs.
Based on the results of Villczca and
Shumway’s (1992a) nonjointness tests, livestock
quantities and prices were not included in the
estimated model, Working with commodity
aggregates, they found that short-run nonjointness
was not rejected for Texas crops.2 Assuming that
their findings apply to this crop reporting district,
livestock prices were ignored when examining
supply response of crops in the district.
The equations
following form:
(i) Q, = 40 + h,R
estimated were of the
+ b,2P2-+b,3P3 +
b,4P4+ b15P5+ bi6P6+ bB7 T +
b,8F + bl@i7 i = 1 ,..., 5,
where Q1-Q~ is quantity supplied of rice, corn, grain
sorghum, hay, and other crops, respectively; PI-P5
is price of commodity I-5 divided by price of the
variable inputs aggregate; P6 is pesticide price
divided by price of the other variable inputs
aggregate; T is time; F is quantity of fixed inputs;
D1-D~is effective diversion payment for commodity
l-5; and b,0-b19 is the corresponding parameter
estimate.
The “other crops” category was an
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value of production). These crops were peanuts,
cotton, wheat, oats, soybeans, sunflower, and barley.
To maintain homogeneity of degree zero in
prices (for consistency with price-taking, profit-
maximizing behavior), all prices in each supply
equation were divided by the aggregate variable
input price. This price was an aggregation of prices
for hired labor, fertilizer, machinery operating
inputs, capital services, feed, seed, and
miscellaneous inputs. The fixed-input quantity was
an aggregation of family labor and land. Aggregate
variables were constructed because of the large
number of inputs used and outputs produced and the
limited number of observations available. These
aggregations reduced the dimensions of the
statistical model and conserved degrees of freedom.
All independent variable aggregates were created
using the Tornqvist index.~
The fixed-input aggregate quantity variable
was dropped from the corn equation due to high
collinearity among the regressors. Because this
variable generally decreased over the data period, its
most likely misspecification effect would be to bias
the estimated temporal parameter, b27, downward.
Since government payments were not paid to restrict
hay production, no diversion payment variable was
included in the hay equation. The diversion
payments variable included in the other crops
aggregate equation was the simple average of
diversion payments for wheat and cotton.
For consistency with previously noted
assumptions, convexity was maintained by the
Cholesky factorization (Lau; Talpaz et a/.), and
symmetry of cross-price parameters was maintained
by linear restrictions. Error terms were assumed to
be normally and independently distributed, with a
constant contemporaneous covariance matrix across
equations. The iterative version of Zellner’s
seemingly unrelated regression (ITSUR) was used to
obtain the variance-covari ance matrix which
transformed the observation matrix. The estimates
were iterated until the covariance matrix stabilized.
Using the stabilized covariance matrix, the nonlinear
constrained optimization procedures of Talpaz et al,
using MINOS version 5.1 were employed to obtain
final parameter estimates,
Pesticide Demand
Because time series data on pesticide use
were not available for the district, no pesticide
demand equation(s) were estimated. Instead, point
estimates of the quantities of major pesticides used
in the district were obtained. Because of data
limitations, the following hypotheses were
maintained to make tractable an analysis of the
effects of an ad valorem tax on pesticide demand:
a. Yield does not respond in the short-run
to pesticide price changes. Therefore, a 1 percent
change in predicted output implies a 1 percent
change in predicted harvested acreage.
b. Land and pesticides are used in fixed
proportions. A 1 percent change in harvested
acreage implies a I percent change in pesticide use.
c. The change in any specific pesticide
depends on the change in harvested acreage of the
crop(s) on which it is applied.
The likely biasing effects of these
assumptions arc somewhat offsetting. For example,
Houck and Gallagher found that corn yield responds
positively to the previous season’s corn price. Both
acreage and variable inputs used per acre likely
change in the same direction as expected output
price. Thus, the percentage change in output likely
overestimates the change in harvested acreage, and
assumption “a” would bias upward the estimated
impact on pesticide use.
On the other hand, McIntosh and Williams
found a significant complementary relationship
between land and pesticides in Georgia. Although
not included in their published paper, Villezca and
Shumway (1992a) obtained the same result for
Texas and Florida. So did Lim, Shumway and
Honeycutt for Illinois and Minnesota.4 Each of
these relationships was elastic, suggesting that
pesticide demand would move in the same direction
as land use, and would change proportionately more
(in most cases much more since three of the four
elasticities exceeded 3.0) than would land.
Therefore, the change in harvested acreage likely
underestimates the change in pesticides, so
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impact on pesticide use and would likely more than
offset the upward biasing effect of assumption “a”.
Finally, although many pesticides are
registered for use on more than one crop, it is
expected that an ad valorem tax on pesticides would
be neutral as to which crops a particular pesticide is
applied. Therefore, the final assumption should not
seriously abstract from reality. The primary biasing
effect of these assumptions on pesticide demand
impacts is expected to be the underestimation due to
assumption “b”.
Pesticide Use and Water Quality
Herbicides accounted for more than 80
percent of all pesticide use in the U.S. in 1982 and
86 percent of pesticide use on U.S. field crops in
1992. Four herbicides (alachlor, atrazine, butylate,
and metolachlor) accounted for more than half of
herbicide usage in 1982 and two-thirds of field crop
herbicide usage in 1992 (Nielsen and Lee; USDA
1993). Each has a moderate-to-high potential to
leach (Nielsen and Lee). Atrazine is highly soluble
(able to dissolve in water) and persistent (able to
resist degradation) and thus is the pesticide most
frequently found in groundwater (Griffin). It was
found in 1.7 percent of community wells and 0.7
percent of rural wells in the 1990 EPA national
survey of drinking water wells. Alachlor was the
next most frequently found pesticide in wells
(Briskin). Atrazine is currently being targeted by
the EPA for possible regulatory action because of
its potential for groundwater contamination.
Alachlor is expected to be the next pesticide
targeted. Both of these herbicides are used
extensively in South Central Texas.
Insecticides are of less concern for
groundwater contamination because they typically
have low volubility and strong absorption (U.S.
Congress; Griffin). However, surface water is also
contaminated by pesticides. A national sampling of
surface water and bed sediments for 18 insecticides
and 4 herbicides found contamination in nearly 10
percent of water samples and 20 percent of bed
sediment samples. Atrazine was the most detected
pesticide in surface water as well as groundwater
(Griffin).
Because scientific data on degradation of
groundwater and surface water quality due to
pesticide applications is extremely weak, it was
presumed that degradation would be slowed in the
same proportion as use of major contaminating
pesticides is reduced. As their application on the
surface is reduced, the amount of pesticide available
for runoff or leaching is reduced. So is the
opportunity for point source pollution of
groundwater. Pesticides are most frequently
regarded as a non-point source polluter of
groundwater due to percolation and leaching through
the soil. Point source pollution also occurs from
mixing spills and cleanup, which generally take
place near the farm well, and is regarded by some
experts as the “most likely route of potential
pollution at this time” (Texas Water Commission
1989b, p. 156). The well can provide chemicals
easy access to the aquifer, especially if the casing is
cracked or corroded (Griffin). Thus, while the
number of potential non-point source contaminants
is more limited, virtually all soluble and persistent
pesticides are candidates for point source
contamination.
Data
Annual production data for the years 1972-
1986 for barley, corn, cotton, grain sorghum, hay,
oats, peanuts, rice, soybeans, sunflower, and wheat
as well as total acreage harvested in the South
Central Texas Crop Reporting District were used to
estimate the supply equations. These data were
electronically acquired from the National
Agricultural Statistics Service. They were
supplemented by published data from Texas Field
Crop Statistics and Texas Small Grains Statistics
(Texas Crop and Livestock Reporting Service).
Texas annual prices for most of these crops
were compiled by Evcnson and associates at Yale
University for 1972-1982 and by McIntosh at the
University of Georgia for 1983-1986. Sunflower
and hay prices were obtained from Texas Field
Crop Statistics. All output price data were state-
Ievel rather than district-level because the latter
were incomplete for our data period.
State-level price data for variable inputs
and quantity data for labor were also obtained from
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sources were primarily USDA’s Agricul~ural
Statistics; Agricultural Prices; State Farm Income
and Balance Sheet Statistics; Field Crops
Production, Disposition, and Value; and the
Chicago Board of Trade’s Statistical Annual.
Government commodity policy data for 1972-1986
were from McIntosh (1989).
Additional sources of data used for
construction of missing values included the USDC’S
Census Of Agriculture (for the years 1978, 1982,
and 1987), USDA’s Agricultural Statistics,
unpublished data from the Texas Crop and
Livestock Reporting Service, and Jones and Hexem.
In the process of assembling data necessary for
esti mat ion, weighted sums, simple averages,
straight-line interpolation, and regression analysis
were used to construct estimates for a few missing
sunflower prices when these values could not be
found elsewhere for this minor crop. The same
methods used by the original compilers of the state-
level data were used in the supplementation when
possible.
A weighted average of the anticipated
market price and effective support price was used as
the expected price of each farm program commodity
(barley, corn, cotton, grain sorghum, oats, peanuts,
rice, soybeans, and wheat), This procedure was
adapted from Remain and was found by Mc lntosh
(199 I) to give better out-of-sample performance
than either of two alternatives in predicting output
supplies and input demands in Texas and three other
states. Consistent with Lim’s findings, one-year
lagged output prices were used as anticipated
market prices for each commodity. ~ Government
policies designed to control commodity supplies
were consolidated by McIntosh (1989) into two
variables, effective support price and effective
diversion payments, following Houck et al.
The fixed-input aggregate was computed as
a Tomqvist index of total harvested acreage in the
district and state-level labor. The latter was scaled
by the ratio of district-to-state harvested acreage.
Means of all data used in the estimation equations
are reported in Table 1.
Data on pesticides used and their
application rates on individual crops produced in
this district were obtained from Texas Crop
Enterprise Budgets (Texas Agricultural Extension
Service 199 I) for Extension Service Districts 10,
11, 13, and 14. Nine of the counties in the South
Central Texas Crop Reporting District are in
Extension Service District 10, two counties are in
District 1I, three in District 13, and seven in
District 14. Additional details were provided
through personal communications with Extension
Management Specialists for Districts 10, 11, and 14
(Cornforth; Gerlow; Pena). Pesticide usage obtained
from the Extension Service budgets and extension
specialists were Iargcly consistent with the
Resources for the Future’s pesticide use inventory
for Louisianah (Gianessi) and with the TAEX’S




Monotonicity of the profit function in
output prices was checked at each observation. No
violations were found. The maintained hypothesis
of convexity of the profit function in prices was
relaxed and tested. It was not rejected at the .05
significance level. Thus, the estimated supply
equations were fully consistent with the theory for
price-taking, profit-maximizing firms.
Parameter estimates are reported in Table
2. There was a negative relationship between
pesticide price and output quantity of all crops
except rice. The empirical finding of some
decreases and some increases in crop output levels
in response to an increase in pesticide price was
consistent with short-run expectations for multiple
outputs when one or more allocatable input (such as
land) constrains production (Moschini).
All crops were estimated to be short-run
economic substitutes to corn. Rice, grain sorghum,
hay, and other crops were all short-run economic
complements to each other. While all normal
jointly-produced outputs are gross economic
complements in the long run, they may be
complements or substitutes in the short run
(Moschini; Leathers). We found evidence of both.
At the .05 level, significant own-price
supply parameters were found for rice, corn, grainJ. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1994 231
Table 1. Summary Production Information Data Means
Expected
Output or Quantity Price Receipts EDF Acres
Input Planted
(thousands) ($/unit) ($1,000) (C/unit) (thousands)
Rice 2,787 cwt. 8.715 24,289 6.939 52.91
Corn 10,645 bu. 2.377 25,303 6.667 187.5
Grain 16,558 bu.
Sorghum
2.154 35,666 6.026 412.7
Hay 797.2 ton 55.09 43,918 382.3b
Other Crops: 266.3 94.58C 25,184 4.435 433.6
Peanuts 49,695 lb. .1799 8,940 37.11
Cotton 15,051 lb. .4648 6,996 41.73
Wheat 2,163 h. 3.108 6,723 157.7
Oats 946.2 bu. 1.423 1,346 185.3
Soybeans 210.5 bu. 5.397 1,136 9.820
Sunflower 1.811 cwt. 13.11 24 .2667





aEDP is the effective diversion payment.
bAcres harvested.
‘Indexes: pesticide price = 10 in 1977; other crops price = 100 in 1982; other
variable inputs and fixed inputs prices = 1.00 in 1982.
sorghum, and other crops. Eight of ten cross-price
parameters were significant. They affected every
crop which suggested that none of these crops was
produced by a short-run nonjoint technology with
respect to other crops. Significant parameters on
diversion payments, fixed input quantity, and time
were estimated in a majority of the supply
equations. Pesticide price was significant in all but
the hay supply equation.
Price elasticity estimates are reported in
Table 3 along with standard errors. The standard
errors are approximate and were computed based on
first-order Taylor-series expansions of the
elasticities (Miller et aL). Own-price response of
rice, grain sorghum, and hay production was
inelastic. [t was elastic for com and other crops
production. Corn price played a particularly
important role in the cropping decisions. Cross-
price elasticities of both rice and grain sorghum
with respect to corn price were larger in absolute
magnitude than were either of their own-price
elasticities.
Two-thirds of the elasticities were
significant at the .05 level. Except for hay, all own-
price elasticities were significant. Except for
elasticities with respect to aggregate variable inputs
price, most cross-price elasticities were also
significant. Prices of hay and other crops were not
significant in the rice supply equation, the price of
rice was not significant in the hay or other crops
equations, and the price of pesticides was not
significant in the hay equation. These were the only
nonsignificant elasticities.
Pesticide Tax
No specific pesticide tax rate has been
proposed in the environmental debates. It is likely232 Shumway and CiIe,sser, Pe,s(/c\de Tax, Cropping Pat(erns, and Water Quality in South Central Texas
Table 2. Parameter Estimates
Equation
Rice Corn Grain Sorghum Hay Other Crops































































































“ All prices were divided by price of other variable inputs. To promote convergence in the nonlinear optimization, all dependent
variable magnitudes were divided by 2238 (which was the largest dependent variable value). Thus, all scaled dependent
variable values were equal to or less than 1.0.
Table 3. Elasticities at the Data Means
Prices
Grain Other Pest- Variable
Quantity Rice Corn Sorghum Hay Crops icicle Inputs
Rice .554 -1.308 .487 .032 .017 .613 -.394
(.09i3) (.189) (.108) (.180) (.139) (.289) (.337)
Corn -1.256 6.727 -2.856 -1.129 -.894 -2.055 1.462
(.315) (1.591) (.689) (.450) (.336) (.831) (3.Otx)
Grain .331 -2.026 .%1 .634 .523 -.415 -.007
Sorghum (.070) (.214) (.1%) (.138) (.160) (.192) (.335)
Hay
.018 -.651 .515 .811 .725 -.811 -.606
(.100) (.241) (.138) (X18) (.274) (.598) (.647)
Other Crops .017 -.898 .741 1.264 1.570 -1.467 -1.226
(.134) (.303) (.250) (.469) (.5%) (.598) (.778)
Note: Approximate standard errors are in parentheses.J. Agr, and Applied Econ,, July, 1994 233
that a serious effort to address environmental
concerns by altering private costs would result in a
substantial tax. Therefore, we chose to examine the
likely effects of a 25 percent ad vakm-em tax on all
pesticides. This simulation was conducted subject
to the admittedly tenuous assumption that our
- parameter estimates would be stable over such a
wide range in this independent variable. However,
while this tax rate may seem large, pesticide prices
actually varied by more than twice this amount over
our data period. Thus, the practical effect of
evaluating this hypothesized Vdxwas to conduct a
simulation well within the range of our actual data.
The anticipated impacts on cropping
patterns are reported in Table 4. A 25 percent ad
valor-em pesticide tax was estimated to decrease
quantities supplied of corn, grain sorghum, hay, and
other crops by 10 to 51 percent. Grain sorghum
would decrease the least and corn the most. The
second largest decrease would be for other crops;
this category includes peanuts and cotton, both
heavy pesticide users.
Although quantities of most crops were
estimated to decrease significantly with a pesticide
tax, one crop (rice) was estimated to increase (by 15
percent). Under multiple-output production, it is not
a theoretical expectation for every output to
decrease when an input price increases. [n fact,
with land and labor fixed, as assumed in this study,
it is unlikely that all outputs would decrease.
Nevertheless, it seems counterintuitive that rice
would be the commodity whose output increases
since it is also a heavy user of pesticides. By way
of caution, it should be noted that harvested acreage
of rice in Texas decreased nearly 40 percent over
the data period (Texas Crop and Livestock
Reporting Service 1973-1 985a; Rister et al.).
Although acreage in the South Central District did
not decline so sharply, it did drop 16 percent while
production increased 12 percent. Production
generally rose during the first half of the data period
followed by a decline to the previous low and a
subsequent partial recovery. The recovery occurred
entirely in the last four years of the data period,
during which high-yielding semidwarf rice varieties
were introduced throughout Texas. Ito et al.
estimated that by 1986 the new varieties were
planted on 76 percent of Texas rice acreage.
Although the estimated pesticide price parameter in
the rice supply equation was positive and
significant, there is a reasonable likelihood that it
may have also picked up some of the effects of
omitted variables, Therefore, both its sign and
magnitude should be interpreted with caution.
Our predicted district-level impacts on
cropping patterns were much larger than state-level
impacts previously estimated for Texas, Florida,
California, Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota, or
Georgia (Villezca and Shumway 1992b; Lim et al.;
McIntosh and Williams). Except for Georgia, it
was estimated that this level of tax on pesticides
would not change any state-level crop supply by
more than one percent. Even in Georgia, no crop
supplies would change by more than 8 percent.
These large differences between estimated state-
Ievel and district-level impacts suggest that
geographic aggregation may diffuse the
distributional impact of such a policy change.
Pesticides containing more than 30 major
active ingredients are applied to crops in this
district. They include herbicides, insecticides,
fungicides, and growth regulators. Their estimated
usage in 199 I is reported in Table 5. Also reported
in that table are the primary crops on which each
pesticide is used and the estimated impact of the
pesticide tax. The estimated impacts are based on
the assumption that harvested crop acreage and
pesticide usage on a crop both change in proportion
to the crop’s output, It is also assumed that
response estimates based on the 1972-1986 data are
relevant for 1991.
No predicted pesticide impacts are made
for the pesticides whose primary application is only
on crops in the “other crops” category. It was
predicted that the output of other crops, which
includes peanuts, cotton, wheat, oats, soybeans,
sunflower, and barley, would decrease by 37 percent
(or I-1/2 times the tax rate). If this category were
separable, all seven of its crops would decrease
proportionately; fixed proportions production would
then imply a 37 percent decrease in each pesticide
used on these crops, However, since the crops were
aggregated based on their low production value
rather than separability arguments, no attempt is
made here to estimate the decrease in individual
pesticides applied only to such crops.234 Shunrwav and C’he,v,rer Pe,v(ict<ie Tax, C’KIppItrgPo[iern,~, and Water Qual[ty In South Cen[ral Texa.v
Table 4. Estimated Impacts of a 25 Percent Ad Va/orem Pesticide Tas at the Data Means






The tax would cause a reduction in application of
most, but not all, pesticides, Because an tncrease in
rice acreage was estimated, pesticides used only on
rice are estimated to also increase.’ They include
the herbicides molinatc and propanil and the
insecticide iprodione. Use of all other pesticides
would decrease. Among those that would decrease
by the largest percent are the herbicide alachlor
(which is the second most frequently detected
pesticide in water WCIIS [Briskin]) and the
insecticides chlorpyrefos and terbufos. Each of
these pesticides is used mainly on corn, the crop
projected to decrease relatively the most.
Several of the pesticides would decrease
proportionately more than the tax imposed. Others,
including atrazine (the most frequently detected
pesticide in both wells and surface water), would
decrease nearly as much as the tax rate. Since the
output of the “other crops” category was also
predicted to decrease substantially, aggregate
pesticide use in this district would also be expected
to decline considerably ~dnd perhaps proportionately
more than the tax rate). These estimates of highly
elastic pesticide demands contrast sharply with prior
estimates of aggregate pesticide demands at the state
Ievcl (Mclntosh and Williams; Villezca and
Shumway 1992b; Lim et al.; Fernandez). Their
estimates of pesticide demand elasticities in nine
states varied from -.04 to -.81, but none was clastlc.
Our distrtct estimates of pesticide response also
exceed Miranowski’s estimates for herbicides and
insecticides used in U.S. corn production and
Carlson and Shui’s estimates for herbicides used in
U.S. corn and soybean production. They are
similar, however, to Carl son and Shui’s estimate for
insecticides used in U.S. cotton production,
Assuming that the parameter estimates
would be valid for a 25 percent increase in pesticide
cost, it is more likely that the maintained hypotheses
of this analysis would underestimate rather than
overestimate responsiveness of pesticide demand to
an ad valorem tax. Therefore, it is possible that
geographic aggregation to the state or national level
greatly diffuses the distributional impact of such a
policy change. Since there is little likelihood that
all areas would respond similarly to a tax on
pesticides, the response in this area may be much
larger than in some other agricultural producing
areas. What is implied by this analysis is that in
this environmentally sensitive district, a moderate
tax on pesticides is expected to substantially reduce
the use of many herbicides, insecticides, flmgicides,
and growth regulators. This reduction in pesticide
use would markedly slow the degradation by
agricultural production of both groundwater and
surface water quality.
Conclusions
To achieve the objective of this study, five
linear output supply equations were estimated as a
system for South Central Texas, an environmentally
sensitive part of the state. The equations were
specified to be consistent with a normalized
quadratic form of the restricted profit function.
They were estimated while maintaining
homogeneity, symmetry, and convexity properties in
output prices. Impacts of a 25 percent ad valorem
pesticide tax on cropping patterns, pesticide
demand, and water quality were examined using the
parameters of these estimated equations.J. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1994
Table 5. Estimates of Pesticides Used and Lower Bound Impacts of a 25 Percent Ad
Valorem Pesticide T- 1991
Estimated Change
Primary Crops Quantity



























































































































































‘A blank in the Estimated Change column means that the pesticide was used primarify on
one or more of the seven crops in the “other crops” category.236 Shumway and Chewer. Pesticide TaJ Cropping Pa([erns, and Wa[er Quali[y in South Central Texas
The estimated impact of the pesticide tax
would be a substantial decrease in the output
supplied in this district of all crops except rice.
Most of the estimated crop supply responses were
significant and large in absolute magnitude.
Quantities demanded of many pesticides would
decrease substantially. Degradation of water quality
would also be markedly slowed. These results
demonstrate that an ad valorem tax on pesticide
would affect supplies of different crops and
demands of specific pesticides in very different
ways. Because pesticides differ in volubility and
persistence, their impact on water quality also
differs. The results demonstrate that a moderate tax
on an environmentally adverse agricultural input
may substantially reduce some of its adverse
consequences in at Icast one environmentally
sensitive area.
Nevertheless, several important questions
remain unanswered. For example, would producers
in other environmentally sensitive areas also
substantially reduce their use of pesticides in
response to an ad valorem tax? If so, then the
public and private efficiencies associated with
imposition of such a simple policy instrument could
result in its being favored over alternatives such as
(a) different tax rates on different ingredients or (b)
area-specific restrictions on specific pesticides. The
dead-weight social welfare loss from enforcing
either of the latter options would be great, Their
enforcement could be justified only if the social cost
of the status quo Is substantial and if desired
changes cannot be achieved by general incentives.
To provide even a partial answer to the posed
question, comparable analyses in other
environmentally sensitive areas will be required.
State-level analyses are not sufficient. Most states
contain much land at low risk for groundwater
contamination and relatively small areas at very
high risk. Some prior state-level studies suggest
that producers would collectively respond little to an
ad valorem pesticide tax. However, there is also
some recent evidence (e.g., Beach and Carlson) that
farmers engaged in environmentally risky activities
do partially internalize the public costs of their
behavior. Additional research is needed to determine
the extent to which, and reasons why, such
economic agents voluntarily consider social
consequences of their actions without explicit
internalization of social costs.
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Endnotes
1. The management practice incentive is more efficient than other options because (a) it permits farmers
to use all available knowledge of their specific farm operations, and (b) it can convey at least as much
information to farmers about the expected external costs of their management decisions as can the
alternatives (Shortle and Dunn, p. 675).
2. Short-run nonjointness of crops could be violated either by technical interdependence with livestock
production or by the effects of a constraining allocatable input.
3. This index is not exact for the normalized quadratic profit fi.mction.240 Shumway and Chewer Pes[iclde Tax, Cropping Patterns, and Wa{er Qualify in South Cenlral Texas
4. Competitive relationships between land and pesticides were found by the latter two studies in three other
states, but none was significant.
5. Lim found that lagged output prices rendered less serious departures from the joint hypothesis of profit
maximization, convex technology, and nonregressive technical change than did any of three alternative price
expectation proxies for agricultural production data in two states (Iowa and Texas). The alternatives were
futures prices, an ARIMA forecast from past prices, and a composite forecast.
6. Texas was not included in the Resources for the Future inventory. Although our study area exhibits
many agroclimatic differences from Louisiana, it is more like this neighboring state than the other
inventoried states.
7. Because of the structural changes that affected rice production during the data period, it is possible that
this estimated increase is spurious. [f so, then the overall decrease in pesticide use in this district due to
the imposition of an ad valorem tax could be even greater than predicted by this study.